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 NOTE 
Challenges and Inconsistencies Facing the 
Posthumously Conceived Child 
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012) 
ANDREW T. PEEBLES* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The use of artificial reproductive technology (ART) has increased sharp-
ly in recent decades1 as families plan ahead in the face of such difficulties as 
disease and military service that raise doubts as to whether reproduction will 
be possible for an individual in the future.  Posthumous conception of chil-
dren is a widely used form of ART, and it allows families to expand, even 
after the death of one of the parents.2  In vitro fertilization is the newest form 
of this technology.3  But for the posthumously conceived child, the difficul-
ties continue as most states bar these children from inheriting Social Security 
survivor’s benefits from a deceased parent.4  The Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States case of Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. has recently given authority 
to this inequality, holding that posthumously conceived children are eligible 
for such benefits if they qualify as a “child” under state intestacy law.5  How-
ever, the Court’s decision in this case has left several problems unresolved 
that will continue to plague courts in the future and will lead to further incon-
sistent decisions and disparities for children born through in vitro fertiliza-
tion.  Due to the rise in the use of this innovative technology, these issues 
affect an increasing portion of the population. 
This Note will discuss the problems with the Supreme Court of the 
United States’ decision, the inconsistencies that exist in state intestacy law, 
and the solutions that are necessary to remedy these challenges.  Part II gives 
a brief background of the facts and circumstances surrounding Astrue.  Part III 
discusses the history of the Social Security Administration and in vitro fertili-
zation and points out the conflicting results from various jurisdictions that 
 
 * B.A., University of Missouri, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2015.  I would like to thank Professor David English for his invalua-
ble guidance and advice throughout the writing of this Note. 
 1. Benjamin C. Carpenter, A Chip off the Old Iceblock: How Cryopreservation 
Has Changed Estate Law, Why Attempts to Address the Issue Have Fallen Short, and 
How to Fix It, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 357-58 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 358-59. 
 3. Id. at 353. 
 4. Id. at 385-86, 401. 
 5. 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012). 
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have dealt with this issue.  Part IV delves into the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
behind its decision in Astrue.  Finally, Part V comments on the reasons Astrue 
was poorly decided, the difficulties that will result from the decision, and the 
methods to resolve these complications. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Karen Capato married Robert Capato in May 1999.6  Robert was diag-
nosed with esophageal cancer soon after the marriage and was told that the 
chemotherapy treatment he required could possibly render him sterile.7  Be-
cause the Capatos wanted children, Robert had his semen deposited and fro-
zen at a sperm bank before undergoing chemotherapy.8  Despite Robert’s 
treatment, Karen conceived naturally and gave birth to a son in August 2001.9  
Robert’s health declined in 2001 and he died in Florida, where he and Karen 
then resided, in 2002.10  In his will, which was executed in Florida, he named 
as beneficiaries the son born of his marriage to Karen and two children from a 
previous marriage.11  “The will made no provision for children conceived 
after Robert’s death.”12  Following the death of her husband, Karen began in 
vitro fertilization using Robert’s frozen sperm.13  In September 2003, eight-
een months after Robert’s death, she gave birth to twins. 
Karen claimed survivor’s insurance benefits on behalf of the twins but 
the Social Security Administration (SSA) denied her application.14  The Unit-
ed States District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed the agency’s 
decision, determining “that the twins would qualify for benefits only if, as     
§ 416(h)(2)(A) [of the Social Security Act (the Act)] specifies, they could 
inherit from the deceased wage earner under state intestacy law.”15  Capato 
was domiciled in Florida at the time of his death, and under Florida’s law, “a 
child born posthumously may inherit through intestate succession only if 
conceived during the decedent’s lifetime.”16 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district 
court’s decision.17  The court concluded that under section 416(e) of the Act 
“‘the undisputed biological children of a deceased wage earner and his wid-
 
 6. Id. at 2026. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.; see also Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006). 
 16. Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2026; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.106 (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 272 (End) of the 2013 1st Reg. Sess. of the 23rd Legislature). 
 17. Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2027. 
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ow’ qualify for survivor’s benefits without regard to state intestacy law.”18  
The court further held that section 416(h), which the SSA had relied upon, 
comes into play only when a claimant’s status as the child of a deceased wage 
earner is in doubt.19  Because the courts of appeals had split on the statutory 
interpretation question this case presented, the Supreme Court of the United 
States granted a writ of certiorari.20 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, examined the re-
lationship between the Act’s provisions to decide if the Capato twins were 
eligible for benefits under the Act’s definition of “children.”21  The Court 
held that section 416(e)’s definition of “child,” the section relied upon by 
Karen Capato, was a “definition of scant utility without aid from neighboring 
provisions.”22  The Court found assistance in the definitions of section 
416(h)(2)(A), relied upon by the SSA, which completed the definition of 
“child” for purposes of the entirety of Subchapter II of the Act, which includ-
ed section 416(e).23  Section 416(h)(2)(A) requires that all child applicants 
qualify under state intestacy law in order to receive benefits, ensuring that 
benefits are given to those clearly within the legislature’s contemplation.24  
The Court believed this reading of the Act’s provisions was more adapted to 
its design to benefit primarily those supported by the deceased [breadwinner 
during] his or her lifetime.25  Thus, under the SSA’s interpretation of the rele-
vant provisions of the Act, the Court held that a posthumously conceived 
child applicant must look to state law to determine if they are entitled to in-
surance benefits as a “child” of a deceased wage earner.26 
 
 18. Id. at 2027 (quoting Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 
626, 631-32 (2011)).  Section 416(e) holds, “The term ‘child’ means (1) the child or 
legally adopted child of an individual.”  42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2006).  The Third Circuit 
found that the undisputed biological child of the Capatos clearly fell within this defi-
nition.  Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d at 631-32. 
 19. Id. at 631.The relevant language of § 416(h) states that, 
In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or current-
ly insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of So-
cial Security shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the de-
volution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such 
insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files application, or, 
if such insured individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was 
domiciled at the time of his death. 
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A). 
 20. Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2027. 
 21. Id. at 2027-28. 
 22. Id. at 2033; see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (stating that “‘child’ means (1) the 
child . . . of an individual”). 
 23. Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2030-31; see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A). 
 24. Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2031. 
 25. Id. at 2026. 
 26. See id. at 2034. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  History of the SSA and In Vitro Fertilization 
Congress enacted the Social Security Act in 1935, providing old age 
pensions, unemployment compensation, and aid to dependent children.27  The 
Act was primarily introduced to combat the problems of economic security in 
a wage-based economy, especially during the Depression of the 1930s.28  
Title II of the Act provided retirement and disability benefits to insured wage 
earners, also known as “social security.”29  An important feature of social 
security was that it provided a financial safety net and protection for workers 
from birth until death.30 
Congress amended Title II in 1939 to offer benefits to the surviving 
family members of a deceased wage earner, including minor children, who 
relied on the wage earner during their lifetime.31  This amendment created “a 
fundamental change in the Social Security program[,]” altering Social Securi-
ty “from a retirement program for workers [only] into a family-based eco-
nomic security program.”32  As the Supreme Court noted in Califano v. Jobst, 
the amended statute was now “designed to provide the wage earner and the 
dependent members of his family with protection against the hardship occa-
sioned by his loss of earnings; it is not simply a welfare program generally 
benefiting needy persons.”33  Thus, children of deceased wage earners were 
entitled to survivorship benefits under the amended Act and received those 
benefits through the probate process of intestate succession. 
The Model Probate Code (MPC) became the first uniform probate act in 
1946 when it was created by the Probate Law Division of the American Bar 
Association (ABA).34  The MPC contained a provision dealing with “after-
born heirs . . . which codified the traditional [common law] rule that all heirs 
must be living or in gestation at the moment of the decedent’s death” to take 
 
 27. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620-48. 
 28. Arianne Renan Barzilay, You’re on Your Own, Baby: Reflections on Ca-
pato’s Legacy, 46 IND. L. REV. 557, 570 (2013). 
 29. Id. at 571; see also Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 53 Stat. 
1362 (1939) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434 (2006)). 
 30. Jill S. Quadagno, Welfare Capitalism and the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 
AM. SOC. REV. 632, 634 (1984). 
 31. Barzilay, supra note 28, at 559; see also 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2006). 
 32. Barzilay, supra note 28, at 573 (alteration in original) (quoting Historical 
Background and Development of Social Security, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http:// 
www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2013)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 33. 434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977) (citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,           
213-14 (1977)). 
 34. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 362. 
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from his estate through intestate succession.35  Then, in 1969, the ABA creat-
ed the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) to replace the MPC, incorporating the 
MPC’s “after-born heirs” provision.36  Despite some insignificant stylistic 
changes to the wording of the statute, the drafters maintained the requirement 
that a child be born or in gestation at the time of the decedent’s death in order 
to be treated as an heir to the estate.37  The concepts of child inheritance out-
lined in these codes “had existed unchanged for over [one] thousand years” 
and up to this time had not encountered any reason to change in any signifi-
cant way.38  Thus, under both the MPC and original UPC, posthumously con-
ceived children, a concept unknown and undiscovered at the time, would not 
have been eligible to inherit from the estate. 
In recent decades, the number of posthumous conceptions in the United 
States has increased sharply, indicative of a trend seen around the world.39  
The term “artificial reproductive technology” encapsulates several proce-
dures, including artificial insemination, surrogacy arrangements, cryopreser-
vation, and in vitro fertilization.40  But it is this latter form of conception that 
has become the subject of a large amount of litigation, and the subject of this 
Note.  In vitro fertilization involves the stimulation of multiple egg produc-
tion by providing medicine to a woman, removing those eggs, combining 
them with sperm and fertilizing them in a laboratory for two to three days, 
and finally relocating one or more embryos to a woman’s uterus.41  Remarka-
bly, researchers estimate that nearly 10,000 children are born through in vitro 
fertilization procedures each year.42  This practice is expected to continue 
well into the future for a number of reasons, including increasing success 
rates for the process, a decreasing stigma associated with the practice, and 
increasing rates of infertility due to couples waiting longer to procreate.43  
Additionally, couples like the Capatos may not have any other choice but to 
pursue ART when debilitating disease or death are looming possibilities. 
 
 35. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 362-63 (citing MODEL PROBATE CODE                  
§ 25 (1946)). 
 36. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 364. 
 37. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 364, (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE                         
§ 2-108 (1969)). 
 38. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 363 (citing Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem 
Conception and a Father’s Last Will, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 105-08 (2004) (tracing this 
approach back to the ancient Romans)). 
 39. Id. at 352-57. 
 40. Id. at 352. 
 41. Id. at 353; see also In Vitro Fertilization: IVF, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N (May 
2007), http://americanpregnancy.org/infertility/ivf.html. 
 42. Am. Soc’y for Repord. Med. et al., 2011 Reproductive Technology Fertility 
Clinic Success Rates Report, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 24 (Aug. 
2013), http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2011/PDFs/ART_2011_Clinic_Report-Full.pdf. 
 43. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 357. 
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B.  Conflicting Decisions on a Novel Issue 
Many novel legal issues and questions have arisen as a result of this new 
reproductive technology.44  Does a child conceived after a parent’s death have 
the right to inherit from that parent?45  If so, is there a time limit on such in-
heritance?46  Are children eligible to receive social security survivor’s bene-
fits from the deceased parent?47  These and several other inquiries have 
forced courts across the country to interpret statutes that were never intended 
to apply to these situations, and as a result, the decisions have been widely 
inconsistent.48  In fact, the Supreme Court granted the Social Security Com-
missioner’s petition for a writ of certiorari in this case solely to resolve the 
split that had arisen in federal circuit courts on this issue.49  A review of mod-
el cases espousing both sides of the issue will help in understanding the inter-
pretations creating the divide. 
In 2002, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts became one of  
the first courts to confront the question of whether posthumous children could 
receive survivor’s benefits in Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Securi-
ty.50  Before undergoing a bone marrow transplant to combat his leukemia, a 
procedure that threatened to leave him sterile, a Massachusetts man deposited 
his semen in a storage facility with the support of his wife of three years.51  
Unfortunately, the bone marrow transplant was unsuccessful, and the husband 
died.52  Two years later, his wife gave birth to twin girls, conceived through 
the use of artificial insemination with her husband’s semen.53  Soon after,    
the wife applied for Social Security survivor’s benefits for herself and her 
twin daughters.54 
The SSA rejected the wife’s claim for child benefits because she had not 
established that the twins were her husband’s children within the meaning of 
section 416(e) of the Act.55  Even after obtaining a judgment of paternity 
from the probate and family court concluding that her husband was the bio-
logical father of the twin girls, the SSA would still not allow the children to 
take survivor’s benefits.56  A United States administrative law judge conclud-
ed that the children did not qualify for benefits because Massachusetts state 
 
 44. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 350. 
 45. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 350. 
 46. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 350. 
 47. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 350. 
 48. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 350. 
 49. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012). 
 50. 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002). 
 51. Id. at 260. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  Child’s benefits were applied for under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) while 
mother’s benefits were applied for under § 402(g)(1).  Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 260-61. 
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intestacy law would not entitle them to inherit such benefits.57  Upon the 
wife’s appeal to the United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts, the court certified the question of inheritance rights to the state’s Su-
preme Judicial Court, finding that “no directly applicable Massachusetts 
precedent exist[ed].”58 
The court began by examining Massachusetts’s intestacy laws, citing 
one statute providing that “[p]osthumous children shall be considered as liv-
ing at the death of their parent.”59  However, the court noted that these stat-
utes had remained unchanged for 165 years, enacted in the early nineteenth 
century at a time when the drafters could not have foreseen the use of the 
modern reproductive technology involved in this case.60  Instead, the court 
established a rule under which posthumously conceived children would be 
deemed “issue” under Massachusetts intestacy law.61  The court determined 
that a child will be held to be the issue of the deceased parent and granted 
inheritance rights if “(1) time limitations do not bar the child’s claim, and (2) 
the surviving parent . . . can establish three facts: (a) a genetic relationship 
exists between the child and the decedent, (b) the decedent consented to post-
death conception, and (c) the decedent consented to support any resulting 
child.”62  Thus, under this test, Mrs. Woodward’s twin girls would be able to 
inherit survivor’s benefits from their deceased father.63  The court believed 
that this test balanced the best interests of the children, the reproductive rights 
of the genetic parents, and the State’s interests in the orderly and prompt ad-
ministration of estates.64 
In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court 
decided Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, a case with facts strikingly similar to 
Astrue v. Capato.65  A husband deposited sperm prior to undergoing chemo-
therapy treatments for cancer.66  The treatments were unsuccessful, and the 
husband died, having agreed with his wife that his sperm should be used to 
have a child after his death.67  Ten months after his death, the wife went 
through in vitro fertilization and gave birth to twins eight months later.68  Her 
eventual application for social security survivor benefits for the twins was 
denied, and she appealed to the Ninth Circuit.69 
 
 57. Id. at 261. 
 58. Id. (quoting the district court’s opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59. Id. at 264 (alteration in original) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 8 
(repealed 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60. Id. at 264. 
 61. Id. at 272. 
 62. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 390 (citing Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272). 
 63. See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272. 
 64. Id. at 264-65. 
 65. 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 66. Id. at 594. 
 67. Id. at 594-95. 
 68. Id. at 595. 
 69. Id. 
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The court held that the posthumously conceived children met the re-
quirements of the Act and that they were thus entitled to survivor benefits.70  
Under the Act, the determination of a child’s eligibility turned on the defini-
tion of “child” and a finding of dependency.71  The court noted that the Act 
defined “child” broadly under section 416(e) “to include any ‘child or legally 
adopted child of an individual’” and that both the “[c]ourts and the SSA had 
interpreted the word . . . to mean the natural or biological child of the in-
sured.”72  Further, the court held that section 416(h) of the Act, relied upon by 
the SSA, had no relevance to the issue because nothing in it suggested that a 
child must prove parentage if it is not disputed.73  Therefore, the only remain-
ing issue was whether the children met the dependency requirements of sec-
tion 402(d) of the Act.74  Section 402(d)(1)(C) entitles a child to the benefits 
of an insured parent if he was dependent upon such individual at the time a 
Social Security application was filed, at the insured individual’s death, or at 
the beginning of the insured’s period of disability entitling him to such bene-
fits.75  Applying this section of the Act, the court found that the dependency 
requirements had been met.76  Thus, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal 
court of appeals to address this issue, ruling in favor of providing social secu-
rity benefits to posthumously conceived children.77 
In 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit gave 
the opposing view of this controversial issue when it decided Schafer v. 
Astrue.78  Don and Janice Schafer were married in 1992, but Don died the 
next year of a heart attack.79  However, Don had deposited his sperm into a 
storage facility because he was undergoing chemotherapy treatment for can-
cer that might have rendered him sterile.80  Through in vitro fertilization 
Janice gave birth to a son, Don’s biological child, seven years after her hus-
 
 70. Id. at 599. 
 71. Karen Minor, Note, Posthumously Conceived Children and Social Sec-   
urity Survivor’s Benefits: Implications of the Ninth Circuit’s Novel Approach          
for Determining Eligibility in Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 35 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 
85, 86 (2005). 
 72. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2006)). 
 73. Id. at 597. 
 74. Id. at 597-98. 
 75. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(C) (2006). 
 76. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597-99. The court noted the broad definition of 
dependency “under the Act, whereby . . . only completely unacknowledged, illegiti-
mate children must prove actual dependency” in order to receive benefits.  Id. at 598.  
In this case, both parents expressly acknowledged their children. Id. at 594-95.  Addi-
tionally, under the law of Arizona, the state in which the father died, the status of 
illegitimacy had largely been eliminated. Id. at 598. 
 77. Minor, supra note 71, at 86. 
 78. 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 79. Id. at 51. 
 80. Id. 
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band’s death.81  Janice applied for Social Security survivor’s benefits on be-
half of her son but was denied.82  The SSA, again relying on section 416(h), 
held that natural children must be able to inherit from the decedent under 
state intestacy law or satisfy certain exceptions to qualify as “children” under 
the Act.83  Mrs. Schafer argued that undisputed natural children such as hers 
plainly fell within section 416(e)’s basic definition of “child,” thus making 
their state intestacy rights irrelevant.84 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment, holding that posthumously 
conceived children were not entitled to benefits under the Act.85  The court 
held that section 416(e)’s definition of “child” was not complete without the 
accompanying structure given to the term by section 416(h).86  Gillett-Netting 
insisted that “child” refers to a “natural child,” allowing section 416(e) to 
independently provide child status to children whose natural or biological 
parentage is undisputed.87  But the Fourth Circuit believed that this reasoning 
“would attribute inconsistent views about child status to the Congress.”88  
The court reasoned that if definite biological parentage was sufficient under 
section 416(e)(1), it would have made no sense for Congress to require those 
whose parentage was initially disputed but was then resolved to prove some-
thing in addition to biological parentage under section 416(h).89  Thus, the 
court decided that the SSA’s interpretation most accurately reflected the text 
and structure of the statute as well as its aim of providing benefits primarily 
to those who lose a wage earner’s support unexpectedly.90 
Finally, in 2011, the Eighth Circuit gave its view of the issues in Beeler 
v. Astrue.91  After getting engaged in 2000, but before the marriage, Bruce 
and Patti Beeler discovered that Bruce had leukemia and needed to undergo 
chemotherapy.92  Due to the possibility that the treatment would cause sterili-
ty in Bruce, the couple decided to deposit his semen in a sperm bank before 
treatment.93  Bruce and Patti were finally married in December of 2000, but 
Bruce was told that his chances for long-term survival were fifty percent.94  
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 50-51. 
 84. Id. at 51. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 55. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  Section 416(h)(3)(C)(ii) provides child status to a child who cannot in-
herit but who can prove both that the insured was the child’s parent and that the in-
sured was “living with or contributing to” the child at the time of death.  42 U.S.C. § 
416(h)(3)(C)(ii) (2006). 
 90. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51. 
 91. 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 92. Id. at 956. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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In making plans for his death, Bruce bequeathed his deposited semen to his 
wife, stating that only she could use it in event of his death.95  Additionally, 
the Beelers signed a form indicating both spouses’ intent to use the semen for 
artificial insemination purposes through in vitro fertilization.96  The form 
further stated that Bruce agreed “to accept and acknowledge paternity and 
child support responsibility of any resulting child or children.”97  Bruce 
Beeler died in Iowa in May 2001 and one year later Patti conceived a child 
who was born in 2003.98  It was undisputed that the child was Bruce Beeler’s 
biological daughter.99 
Patti thereafter filed an application for child’s insurance benefits but was 
denied by the SSA.100  After a hearing before an administrative law judge,   
the agency’s appeals council held that the Beeler’s posthumously conceived 
child was “not the child of the wage earner within the meaning of the Social 
Security Act (Act) and is not entitled to benefits.”101  Beeler sued the Social 
Security Commissioner in 2009, seeking review of the SSA’s denial of bene-
fits.102  The district court reversed the SSA’s decision, and the Commissioner 
timely appealed.103 
Iowa’s afterborn-heirs provision was based on the MPC’s language    
requiring a child to be “begotten before [the intestate’s] death but born there-
after” if it was to be eligible for survivor’s benefits.104  The court held that 
because the child was not conceived until a year after Bruce Beeler’s death, 
the child was not ‘begotten’ before his death, as required by the plain lan-
guage of the Iowa statute.105  Thus even though the Beelers had explicitly 
stated in writing that they intended to conceive the child posthumously, and 
even though there was no dispute that Bruce was the biological father, the 
court would not allow the child to receive survivor’s benefits due to its reli-
ance on state law.106  Although the Iowa legislature amended its after-born 
heirs provision following this case to recognize posthumously conceived 
children, this case is still relevant for the states that continue to follow the 
MPC’s language.107 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 957. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (quoting the Appeals Council’s opinion) (internal quotation marks     
omitted). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 398 (quoting MODEL PROBATE CODE § 25 
(1946)); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220 (West, Westlaw through immediately 
eff. legislation signed as of 3/14/2014 from the 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
 105. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 398-99 (citing Beeler, 651 F.3d at 965). 
 106. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 966. 
 107. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 399. 
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol79/iss2/8
2014] CHALLENGES AND INCONSISTENCIES 507 
As is evidenced by these opposing cases, courts across the country have 
grappled with the difficult question of whether or not a child born posthu-
mously may claim survivor’s benefits under the SSA.  Courts have interpret-
ed the language of the Act’s relevant sections, primarily focusing on sections 
416(e) and (h), with differing views as to what they mean.  The cases above 
involved nearly identical factual situations, yet the courts reached opposite 
conclusions, primarily due to the wide variations in states’ inheritance stat-
utes.  The definition of “child” had long been an issue of relative ease.       
But with the advent of posthumous conception and the recent rise in its use, 
who is considered a “child” for inheritance purposes has taken on new diffi-
culties.  Not until the decision was handed down by the Supreme Court in 
Astrue v. Capato had there been an authority attempting to contribute con-
sistency to these problems. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve an issue of 
first impression: whether a child conceived through in vitro fertilization is 
entitled to inherit Social Security survivor’s benefits from a deceased par-
ent.108  Answering this question required the Court to interpret relevant sec-
tions of the Social Security Act to determine legislative intent and to decide if 
the Capato twins qualified as “children” under the Act’s definitional provi-
sions.109  Thus, most of the Court’s opinion was focused on settling conflicts 
between sections 402(e) and (h), the core issue in prior case law decisions 
that had arisen concerning this new technology. 
The Court first rejected Capato’s proposed definition and argument   
that because the twins are undeniably the “biological child[ren] of married 
parents,” they are entitled to survivor’s benefits.110  It did this by pointing        
out that nothing in section 416(e)’s definition of “child” indicates that Con-
gress interpreted the term to solely refer to the children of married parents.111  
Additionally, section 416(e) does not suggest that Congress intended biologi-
cal parentage to be a precondition to achieving child status under that provi-
sion.112  In fact it was pointed out that in 1939 when the Act was passed, 
“there was no such thing as a scientifically proven biological relationship 
between a child and [his] father,” and as a result, the word “biological” does 
not appear anywhere in the Act.113  Furthermore, the Court, citing various 
 
 108. See Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 2029-30. 
 111. Id. at 2029; see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2006) (defining “child” as “the  
child . . . of an [insured] individual”). 
 112. Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2030. 
 113. Id. 
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statutes, noted that existing law does not necessarily recognize a biological 
parent as a child’s legal parent.114 
The Court then turned to interpret the relevant section of the Act.115  It 
pointed out that section 416(h)(2)(A)’s opening statement provided a “textual 
clue”: “‘In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of [an] insured 
individual for purposes of this subchapter,’ the Commissioner shall apply 
state intestacy law.”116  The subchapter to which this instruction refers is 
Subchapter II of the Act, spanning sections 401-434, which means that sec-
tion 416(h) applies to and controls sections 402(d) and 416(e).117  Section 
416(h) requires turning to state law to determine a child’s inheritance rights; 
on this point, the Court held that “the statute’s text ‘could hardly be more 
clear.’”118  It was also noted that, on matters of family status, the Act fre-
quently refers to state law, indicating that such a reference “is anything but 
anomalous.”119 
The Court then turned to Congress’ intentions for the Act, holding that 
the “core purpose” of the legislation was to “provide . . . dependent members 
of [a wage earner’s] family with protection against the hardship occasioned 
by [the] loss of [the insured’s] earnings.”120  It was also stated that children 
would “more likely be dependent during the parent’s life and at his death.”121  
Thus, according to the Court’s logic, a child never having depended on a par-
ent’s income will not have suffered any additional financial hardship at the 
death of that parent.122  It was further stated that relying on state intestacy law 
to determine who qualifies as a “child” would serve the Act’s driving objec-
tive.123  The Court believed that determining eligibility under state intestacy 
law would be a feasible substitute for arduous case-by-case determinations 
whether the child was actually dependent on her father’s earnings.124 
Finally, the Court held that the SSA’s interpretation and reading of the 
relevant statutes was reasonable and, therefore, entitled to the Court’s defer-
ence under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
 
 114. Id. (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2014 
Reg. Sess. and all propositions on the 6/3/2014 ballot); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
46, § 4B (West, Westlaw through Chapter 43 of the 2014 2nd Annual Session); UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE § 2-119(a) (amended 2010)). 
 115. Id. at 2030-33. 
 116. Id. at 2030-31 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006)). 
 117. Id. at 2031. 
 118. Id. (quoting Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 54 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 2032 (alteration in original) (quoting Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52 
(1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 121. Id. (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 514 (1976)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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Inc.125  Under Chevron, deference to an agency’s reading of its statute is ap-
propriate “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency 
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that [its]                   
interpretation . . . was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”126  The 
Court noted that the SSA’s longstanding interpretation of its Act was set forth 
in regulations published after notice and comment rulemaking.127  Congress 
gave the Social Security Commissioner authority to promulgate rules neces-
sary to carry out his functions and relevant statutory provisions.128  Finally, 
the SSA’s regulations are neither arbitrary or capricious in substance, nor 
contrary to the statute.129  Thus, the agency’s reading warranted the Court’s 
deference, and the Court ultimately ruled in favor of the SSA, denying a child 
conceived in vitro the opportunity to inherit Social Security survivor’s bene-
fits from a deceased wage earner. 
V.  COMMENT 
The Court’s decision in this case raises several problems that will wreak 
havoc on courts and cause additional litigation until properly resolved.  First 
of all, Capato’s reliance on state law to determine the inheritance rights of a 
child conceived in vitro will result in inconsistent decisions on this issue in 
the future as courts apply fifty separate and distinct sets of laws to similar 
situations.  Second, the Court applied a statute that was never intended to deal 
with ART and, thus, applied a statute that is out of date and in need of revi-
sion.  Finally, the Court wrongfully distinguishes between children in very 
similar situations, barring posthumously conceived children from recovering 
survivor’s benefits while still allowing children born out of wedlock to inherit 
such benefits.  In response to these issues, it is necessary for states to reform 
their inheritance statutes to directly address posthumous children’s inher-
itance rights, using the UPC as a reference.  Congress would also be wise to 
amend the SSA, creating a uniform federal standard explicitly addressing the 
rights of posthumously conceived children. 
 
 125. Id. at 2033 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (requiring federal courts interpreting ambiguous statutes to 
defer to reasonable interpretations of such statutes by the agencies charged with their 
implementation)).  In this case, the Act’s relevant provisions are subject to several 
varying interpretations, thus, the Court deferred to the SSA’s interpretation because it 
was charged with implementing the Act. Id. at 2034. 
 126. Id. at 2033-34 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 
(2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 127. Id. at 2028-29 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.354-404.355 (2012)). 
 128. Id. at 2034. 
 129. Id. (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 
S. Ct. 704, 711 (2011)). 
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A.  Inconsistent Results for Similar Cases 
In basing its decision on section 416(h)(2)(A) of the SSA, the Supreme 
Court requires all courts to look to the intestacy law of the state in which the 
decedent was domiciled at death.130  This results in the application of fifty 
separate and distinct sets of Social Security laws being applied to nearly iden-
tical cases, a situation which will inevitably result in inconsistent decisions.  
Although posthumous conception has existed for several decades, the majori-
ty of states have not yet addressed posthumously conceived children in their 
intestacy statutes.131  Twenty-six states maintain probate codes based on one 
of the several model or uniform acts passed in the last seventy years.132        
Of these acts, only the 2008 revision of the Uniform Probate Code, followed 
in full by only two states,133 directly addresses the inheritance rights of a 
posthumously conceived child.134  The remainder of states address the rights 
of children born posthumously but do not provide for those conceived     
posthumously or explicitly bar inheritance in such situations.135  As a result, 
“[a] child conceived posthumously could inherit intestate, and in turn qualify 
for survivors’ benefits, in one state, while a child conceived and born under 
the exact circumstances in a neighboring state would be denied both.”136 
To show the arbitrary and inconsistent outcomes that result from con-
flicting state law, one need only compare the decisions of In re Estate of Ko-
lacy and Finley v. Astrue.137  In Kolacy, the New Jersey Superior Court held 
that its intestacy statute, mirroring the 1969 version of the UPC, did not apply 
to cases involving inheritance rights of children conceived posthumously, as 
the legislature could not have intended for it to cover such cases.138  It instead 
allowed for such inheritance under its own test, holding that the legislature 
“manifested a general intent that the children of a decedent should be amply 
provided for with respect to property passing from him or through him as the 
result of a death.”139  In Finley, the Arkansas Supreme Court construed statu-
tory language almost identical to that in Kolacy but reached the opposite re-
 
 130. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006). 
 131. Courtney Hannon, Comment, Astrue v. Capato: Forcing a Shoe That 
Doesn’t Fit, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 403, 426 (2013). 
 132. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 362. 
 133. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-120 (West, Westlaw through laws effective 
May 17, 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-04-19 (West, Westlaw through 2013 
Reg. Sess.). 
 134. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 372, 374; see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-
120(f) (amended 2010). 
 135. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 376-83. 
 136. Hannon, supra note 131, at 427. 
 137. Compare 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000), with 270 S.W.3d 
849 (Ark. 2008). 
 138. Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1261-62, 1264. 
 139. Id. at 1262. 
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sult.140  The court decided that the Arkansas legislature when enacting its 
intestacy statute did not intend for a child conceived in vitro after the father’s 
death to inherit, as the statutory language lacked language specifically ad-
dressing such a scenario.141  Thus, as shown here, even states with almost 
identical statutory language interpret such words differently, leading to in-
consistent results for similar cases. 
The solution to this problem lies in the language of the 2008 amendment 
to the UPC.  As previously discussed, the UPC is the only model code in ex-
istence that specifically addresses posthumously conceived children and pro-
vides a solution.142  Under this code, a child may inherit for probate purposes 
if two conditions are met: the deceased parent must have intended to be treat-
ed as a parent of the child, and the child must have been in utero no later than 
thirty-six months after the parent’s death or born no later than forty-five 
months after the parent’s death.143  Because this code is the only option actu-
ally addressing the difficult problem of posthumously conceived children’s 
intestacy rights, it is the ideal model for states to design their intestacy statute 
around.144  Thus far, only Colorado and North Dakota have adopted these 
particular provisions of the UPC.145  However, if every state would adopt 
similar provisions focusing on the decedent’s intent to be treated as the 
child’s father, rather than relying on fifty varying sets of laws, the problem of 
inconsistent decisions would be resolved. 
Consistency among the intestacy laws of all fifty states is preferable to 
the current state of things for several reasons.  It is inequitable to allow a 
child in one state to inherit from a deceased parent when a child in the exact 
same situation is barred from doing so in another state.  Both children are 
likely to grow up in a single parent household where resources and finances 
are restricted, making access to survivor’s benefits vital.  Both deceased par-
ents are likely to have planned for the birth of the child and would want them 
to inherit their Social Security benefits to give the children the support the 
parents will no longer be able to give.  Relying on differing interpretations of 
various state statutes rather than a single uniform law twists the intentions of 
parents employing ART and, in many cases, results in outcomes that are con-
tradictory to the future they envisioned for their children.  Consistency in 
 
 140. Compare id. at 1260 (construing the following statutory language: “Relatives 
of the decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had 
been born in the lifetime of the decedent”), with Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 853 (constru-
ing the following statutory language: “Posthumous descendants of the intestate con-
ceived before his or her death but born thereafter shall inherit in the same manner as if 
born in the lifetime of the intestate”). 
 141. Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 853. 
 142. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 372. 
 143. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f), (k) (amended 2010). 
 144. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 372. 
 145. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-120 (West, Westlaw through laws effective 
May 17, 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-04-19 (West, Westlaw through 2013 
Reg. Sess.). 
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states’ intestacy statutes will provide equality to families forced to use ART 
and avoid these unpredictable results that are emotionally and financially 
draining to thousands of families nationwide. 
B.  Social Security Act’s Out of Date Provisions 
Artificial reproductive technology, such as in vitro fertilization, did not 
become widely used until the 1950s.146  The SSA was enacted in 1935 pri-
marily for purposes of economic security.147  It was not until 1939 that the 
Act was amended to provide benefits for a deceased wage earner’s family.148  
Due to the decades between these events, the drafters of the Act could not 
have foreseen the rise of the reproductive technology that is now so widely 
used.  Furthermore, they could not, and clearly did not, create provisions 
dealing with situations such as that found in Capato.  The Act makes no men-
tion of posthumously conceived children but focuses only on those children 
conceived before the death of the wage earner. 
Therefore, courts have been applying a statute that was never intended 
to apply to questions of whether a child conceived after a father’s death may 
inherit.  As a result, the SSA does not conform to modern realities and “at-
tempting to make [it] fit leads to unpredictability and injustice.”149  The pro-
visions of the SSA are thus unfit to be used in determining these significant 
issues and are in need of amending.  Congress needs to create a uniform and 
controlling standard for determining who may inherit survivor’s benefits, 
rather than relying on conflicting and varied state law.  Instead of fifty differ-
ent Social Security regimes, a single, unified inheritance statute reflecting 
modern realities is necessary.  Social Security benefits are federal benefits 
provided to citizens of every state.  Consequently, there is a compelling need 
for a single federal statute creating uniformity in the administration of those 
benefits, eliminating the inconsistent decisions now plaguing intestacy law. 
Such a statute should place emphasis on carrying out the decedent’s ac-
tual intent to be treated as the child’s father, an important principle in intesta-
cy law.  The 2008 amendments to the UPC allow a posthumously conceived 
child to inherit survivor’s benefits from a deceased parent when, among other 
requirements, the decedent intended to be treated as the child’s parent.150  
Thus, if the decedent consented to the use of his sperm for posthumous re-
production, it can be found to be clear and convincing evidence that he would 
have wanted the child to inherit.  Creating such a statute would eliminate the 
inconsistent results that are found in situations where the decedent’s clear 
 
 146. Kristine S. Knaplund, Legal Issues of Maternity and Inheritance for the Bio-
tech Child of the 21st Century, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 393, 395 (2008). 
 147. Barzilay, supra note 28, at 570. 
 148. Id. at 559. 
 149. Hannon, supra note 131, at 426. 
 150. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) (amended 2010). 
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intent was for the child to inherit, but where courts disregard such intentions 
in favor of the application of fifty distinct state intestacy laws. 
C.  Wrongfully Distinguishing Children in Similar Situations 
The Court held that the primary purpose of the Act was to provide “de-
pendent members of [a wage earner’s] family with protection against the 
hardship occasioned by [the] loss of [the insured’s] earnings.”151  It was fur-
ther reasoned that, when discussing a child’s inheritance under intestacy law, 
a child is thought to be more dependent during the parent’s life.152  For this 
reason, the Court decided that children who were not conceived until after a 
parent’s death would not have been dependent on the wages earned by that 
parent.153  However, in making this decision, the Court failed to explain why 
children born out of wedlock and children conceived days before the death of 
the father are still entitled to benefits from the parent.  In all of these cases, 
the child cannot realistically be said to have relied on the father’s wages.  
However, only the child conceived in vitro is barred from inheriting under the 
Act, a result that is prejudicial and unbalanced. 
With the exception of the 2008 amendments to the UPC, several model 
or uniform acts followed by a majority of states fail to even address the rights 
of posthumously conceived children, excluding them from inheritance 
obliquely.154  The 1946 Model Probate Code, currently followed by four 
states,155 includes an “after-born heirs” provision codifying “the traditional 
rule that all heirs must be living or in gestation at the moment of the dece-
dent’s death.”156  Thus, posthumously conceived children, who are not “be-
gotten” before the decedent’s death, would be excluded from inheriting from 
a deceased father.  The original versions of the UPC include similar language 
barring such children from inheritance rights in section 2-108.157  The 1969 
version of this section, still followed by three states,158 held that “[r]elatives 
of the decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter inherit as if 
they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent.”159  Under this language, a 
relative of the decedent conceived after his death cannot inherit.  The 1990 
amendment to section 2-108 states, “An individual in gestation at a particular 
time is treated as living at that time if the individual lives 120 hours or more 
 
 151. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2032 (2012) (quoting Cali-
fano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977)). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 372-83. 
 155. Id. at 364.  The four states are Indiana, Ohio, Maryland, and Penn-           
sylvania.  Id. 
 156. Id. at 362-63; see also MODEL PROBATE CODE § 25 (1946). 
 157. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (1969). 
 158. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 365.  Maine, Nebraska, and Tennessee still follow 
this language.  Id. 
 159. Id. at 364. 
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after birth.”160  Nine states still follow this version.161  The Commissioners 
did not provide a comment to explain the intent of this change, but it is likely 
that posthumously conceived children were sought to be excluded.162 
However, while prohibiting the posthumously conceived child from   
inheriting survivor’s benefits, these codes still allow children in similar situa-
tions to inherit, even though dependence on the deceased parent for support 
during their lifetimes is non-existent.  For example, under section 2-114(a)   
of the older versions of the UPC, “[A]n individual is the child of his [or      
her] natural parents, regardless of their marital status.”163  This means that a 
child could inherit Social Security benefits from a father who, after divorcing 
the child’s mother, had left the familial picture altogether.  Additionally, the 
Uniform Parentage Act of 2000 states in section 204, “A man is presumed to 
be the father of a child if . . . the child is born within 300 days after the [par-
ent’s] marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, 
or divorce.”164  Thus, in certain circumstances under this Act, a child con-
ceived days before the father had died and born after his death would be enti-
tled to inherit benefits. 
In such situations of divorce or death, the child would not have actually 
depended on the father during his lifetime, similar to a posthumously con-
ceived child.  But in sharp contrast, the children covered by these codes are 
eligible to receive survivor’s benefits under the SSA, while the posthumously 
conceived child, confusingly, is not.  This inconsistency seems to have been 
overlooked by the Supreme Court in its Astrue decision.  If the Court were 
genuinely concerned with providing “dependent members of [a wage earn-
er’s] family with protection against the hardship occasioned by [the] loss of 
[the insured’s] earnings,”165 it would not have disadvantaged the posthumous-
ly conceived child by arbitrarily applying this principle while still allowing 
other non-dependent children in similar circumstances to benefit. 
 
 160. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (amended 1990).  The 2008 amendments to 
the UPC moved the content of this section to section 2-104(a)(2).  Carpenter, supra 
note 1, at 430. 
 161. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 366.  The states are Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, 
Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Id. 
 162. Id. at 365. 
 163. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a) (amended 1990) (emphasis added).  This 
section was moved to section 2-117 after the 2008 amendments. See UNIF. PROBATE 
CODE § 2-117 (amended 2010). 
 164. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (amended 2000).  The average pregnancy peri-
od for humans is forty weeks, or 280 days.  Baby Due Date, BETTER HEALTH 
CHANNEL, http://www.betterhealth.vic.gov.au/bhcv2/bhcarticles.nsf/pages/Baby_due 
_date (last visited Mar 22, 2014). 
 165. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2032 (2012) (quoting Cali-
fano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977)). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Astrue v. Capato rests on unjust and 
flawed reasoning for three main reasons.  Relying on state law to decide the 
status of a posthumously born child will only continue to result in varied de-
cisions on nearly identical situations due to the many inconsistent and assort-
ed intestacy statutes throughout the states.  Additionally, applying the outdat-
ed Social Security Act to posthumous conception situations that were never 
contemplated at the statute’s drafting results in inequitable results for such 
children.  Finally, the Court’s holding discriminates against posthumously 
conceived children who are just as entitled to survivor’s benefits as are post-
humously born children and those born out of wedlock, neither group of 
whom actually relied on the wage earner during their lifetimes.  To rid our 
legal system of these inconsistencies, it is necessary to revise and update the 
Social Security Act to reflect modern society and its conception practices and 
directly address the intestacy rights of posthumously conceived children.  
Additionally, states should conform their intestacy statutes, many which are 
also out of date, to the modern UPC, which provides a workable solution to 
these issues.  Finally, intestacy statutes should treat children in similar cir-
cumstances equally, instead of illogically disadvantaging a small group.  On-
ly then will we find consistency in judicial decisions regarding intestacy 
rights of children born through posthumous conception and finally provide 
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